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CASENOTE
RCRA versus CERCLA: The Clash of the
Titans in Colorado v. United States Dep't of
the Army
James M. Lenihan
I. Introduction
The State of Colorado and the United States Department
of the Army have struck the initial blows in what may prove
to be a long and significant environmental battle. The focus of
the controversy is a toxic waste disposal site in the United
States Department of the Army's Rocky Mountain Arsenal
(Arsenal). The State of Colorado (Colorado) and the United
States Department of the Army (the Army) in Colorado v.
United States Dep't of the Army, both plaintiff and defend-
ant respectively, have claimed jurisdiction and control over
the cleanup of a toxic waste holding basin.1
Although the area in dispute is only a small part of the
Army's entire Arsenal cleanup effort, the controversy stems
from Colorado's claim of jurisdiction over the cleanup under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 19762
(RCRA). The Department of the Army, however, claims sov-
1. 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988).
1
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ereign immunity from the enforcement actions brought by
Colorado. The Army claims that, because it was required to
clean up the Arsenal under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), Colorado should not be permitted to interfere with its
cleanup actions, which were already being directed by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA). The United States
District Court of Colorado disagreed with the Army. The
court held that a federal reservation designated for cleanup by
the EPA under CERCLA was not immune from a subsequent
state enforcement action brought under RCRA.4
The District Court ruling has pushed the issues of sover-
eign immunity and jurisdiction over federal facilities in envi-
ronmental litigation to a precipice. As the remainder of this
note will demonstrate, the court's decision in this case has left
the participants dangling precariously. Part II of this note will
discuss the historical background of the Rocky Mountain Ar-
senal, which is the subject of this litigation. Part III will ad-
dress the procedural history and legal issues of the contro-
versy between the State of Colorado and the Army. The
opinion of the court will be presented in Part IV, with an
analysis of the decision following in Part V. Part VI will con-
clude with an examination of the possible ramifications of this
decision and an identification of some troubling issues for fu-
ture consideration.
II. Historical Background
Since 1942 the defendant, the United States Department
of the Army, has owned and operated a chemical munitions
facility outside Denver, Colorado. The facility, known as the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, encompasses about 27 square miles
in Adams County, north of Denver.5 The Arsenal was con-
structed in 1942 to support the Department of Defense' re-
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
4. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1571.
5. Id. at 1563; United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (D. Colo.
1985).
6. The U.S. Army is the Department of Defense's sole proponent for production
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quirements for life cycle management 7 of chemical agents and
munitions.' Its current mission includes the demilitarization 9
and disposal of toxic materials.10
In 1947, the Army began leasing portions of the Arsenal
to private corporations who used the facility to develop, test,
manufacture, and package pesticides, herbicides, and other
chemicals." The Army built a common sanitary sewer system
and a common waste disposal system to handle wastes gener-
ated by day-to-day Army operations as well as those of its
other lessees."2 In 1956, the Army constructed and com-
menced operation of toxic waste holding basins to store and
dispose of chemical manufacturing and processing by-prod-
ucts. s One of these basins, Basin F, is the subject of this
litigation.
The Arsenal waste disposal systems' ultimate failure re-
sulted in a toxic release comprised of commingled wastes gen-
erated by the Army and the Arsenal's tenants."' This system's
failure created what may be one 'of the worst hazardous and
toxic waste sites in America."5 The released chemicals have
taken their toll on the wildlife, contaminating the air, land,
ground water, and surface waters within the Arsenal, and by
and management of conventional ammunition and munitions. United States Army
Material Command Mission Statement. Department of Defense Directive 5160.65
(November 1981), Single Manager Assignment for Conventional Ammunition.
7. Cradle to grave management of weapon systems or programs. See Department
of Defense Directive 5000.1 (February 1981); Defense Aquisition Department of De-
fense Instruction 5000.2 (February 1991); Defense Aquisition Management Policies
and Procedures; Army Regulation 70-1, Systems Aqusition Policy and Procedures,
ch. 3 (Nov. 12, 1986).
8. The Arsenal was used to manufacture, test, assemble, demilitarize, detoxify,
and dispose of chemical warfare agents and products, as well as incendiary munitions.
Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1563; Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1067.
9. The process of rendering a product useless for military purposes. Webster's
3rd International Dictionary 599 (3rd ed. 1981).
10. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1067. "The United States Department of the
Army has used various portions of the Arsenal for the manufacture, testing, demilita-
rization, disposal and other handling of various chemical agents and munitions." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1563.
14. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1067.
15. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1570.
1991]
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contaminating or threatening to contaminate the surrounding
area.16 As a result of this incident, several legal actions were
initiated. Many of the actions remain unresolved, replete with
claims, counter-claims and cross claims creating a complex
web of pre-trial motions.
III. Procedural History and Legal Issues
A. Procedural History
In 1975, Colorado issued several administrative orders re-
quiring the Army and Shell Oil Company (Shell) to clean up
all sources of designated chemicals, to undertake a ground-
water monitoring program, and to cease certain chemical dis-
charges. 17 The Army responded by initiating an investigation
and subsequent testing "to determine the existence, extent
and sources of contamination at the Arsenal."18 It also chose
to undertake response actions designed to prevent or control
the spread of chemicals off the Arsenal property and to pre-
vent public exposure to the chemicals. 19 In 1982, a Memoran-
dum of Agreement was signed by the EPA, Colorado, the
Army, and Shell regarding removal, remedial and other re-
sponse actions taken or planned by the Army.2 0
By December 1983, the Army was completing its response
plan for the Arsenal cleanup and had incurred expenses of ap-
proximately $48,000,000 as a result of its response to actual or
threatened releases at the Arsenal.2 ' During this same time,
Colorado commenced a civil action by filing suit against the
Army and Shell on December 9, 1983.22 One month later, in
16. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1067.
17. Id. It is important to note that both the accident and ensuing actions taken
by Colorado pre-dated both RCRA and CERCLA. The response taken by the Army
was in compliance with its own Installation Restoration Program, a self-imposed en-
vironmental program adopted throughout the Department of Defense in 1975. For a
brief description of the Installation Restoration Program, see U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Commanders Guide to Environmental Compliance, 64-67 (1989).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1068.
21. Id.
22. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, No. 83-C-2386 (D. Colo. filed
[Vol. 8
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January 1984, the Army submitted its Draft Decontamination
Assessment for Land and Facilities at Rocky Mountain Arse-
nal with four alternative proposals for the cleanup.2s The
Army recommended adoption of the first alternative at a cost
of $360,000,000.24 Yet, by October 1984, Colorado still had not
accepted the plan.2
In October 1984, the Army commenced a CERCLA Re-
medial Investigation and Feasibility Study at the Arsenal.2 6
The Army consequently filed suit against Shel2 7 seeking dam-
ages of $1.8 billion in potential cleanup costs.2 The district
court consolidated these two cases in United States v. Shell
Oil Co., where it denied Shell's pre-trial dismissal motions 9
and ruled that the Army's claim for $1.86 billion was a per-
missible figure."0 In June 1986, the interim remedial action
Dec. 9, 1983).
23. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Colo. 1985).
"[T]he Rocky Mountain Arsenal Contamination Control Program Management Team
outlined four alternative cleanup programs, with costs ranging from $210,000,000 to
$1,860,000,000." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing October 23, 1984 letter from F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice).
26. Colorado v. United States Dep't of-the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (D.
Colo. 1989).
27. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1086.
28. Id.
29. Id.
[I] find and conclude, that more efficient management of the action and of
No. 83-C-2386 can be accomplished if the two cases are consolidated, at least
for all pre-trial matters. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Shell's motion
for partial dismissal of the first claim for relief is denied [because CERCLA's
statutory scheme authorized recovery of pre-enactment response costs] ...
that Shell's motion to join the Army as defendant is denied [because the
Army as defendant would result in the Army suing itself since it is a trustee
of federal land] ... that Shell's motion to join the State of Colorado as a
plaintiff is denied [because there was no "substantial risk" that Shell would
be subject to multiple or inconsistent obligations] . . . that Shell's renewed
motion to strike is denied [because claimed damages were not redundant or
scandalous].
Id.
30. Id. at 1085.
The $1.8 billion allegation in the complaint corresponds to the "worst case"
scenario, the most expensive cleanup option.
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plan for Basin F was proposed by the Army.31 Thereafter, Col-
orado filed for an injunction in the state court to halt the
Army's alleged present and future violations of pertinent envi-
ronmental regulations32 by the continued operation of the 93-
acre hazardous waste surface impoundment area known as
Basin F.3 - In addition, Colorado specifically asserted numer-
ous violations of Colorado's State Ground Water Monitoring
Regulations.3 4
The Army removed the case from the state court to the
United States District Court of Colorado in January 1987,
where it sought dismissal of the action or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment as to Colorado's claims.35 The Army's
position was that Congress had not waived federal sovereign
immunity, therefore it was not required to comply with Colo-
rado's hazardous waste management provisions. Moreover, the
Army argued that federally-supervised CERCLA cleanup ac-
The proposal made by the Army is at present tentative and conceptual
in nature. Further studies and planning must be conducted before a final
decision is made and the plan implemented. Apparently, the Army is seeking
a solution in cooperation with the State of Colorado. Colorado has not yet
commented on or approved the proposal. Moreover, comments on the plan
have not been received from Shell or the public. The Army will review these
comments before making a final decision.
Id.
31. Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1568.
32. Id. at 1563; 6 CoLo. CODE REGS. § 1007-3 (1982).
33. Can a Jurisdictional Showdown Under Superfund Be Avoided?, 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327-28 (Aug. 1989)[hereinafter Showdown].
34. Id.
Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste
Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities, [6 CoLo. CODE REGs. § 1007-3
(1982)] issued pursuant to the Colorado Hazardous Waste Management Act
[CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15-301-13 (1982)]. These claims include: (1) failure to
provide and monitor complying upgradient monitoring wells, in violation of
[section] 265.91(a)(1) (First Claim); (2) failure to submit a specific ground
water monitoring program, inviolation of [section] 265.93(d)(2) (Second
Claim); (3) failure to determine impact of Basin F on ground water quality
assessment, in violation of [6 COLO. CODE RaGS. § 1007-3 (1982)] [section]
265.93(d)(2) (Third Claim); and failure adequately [sic] to monitor and re-
port groundwater quality assessment, in violation of sections 265.93(d)(5) and
(7).
Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1563-64.
35. Id. at 1564.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/10
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tivities preempted any state initiated RCRA compliance
requirements.3 6
In December 1987, Colorado filed an amended complaint
against the Army based on a state plan 37 to close Basin F."5
The Basin F Closure Plan (Plan) which became effective on
October 2, 1986 required the Army to close Basin F within
one year. 39 Because the Army did not seek review or appeal of
this plan, Colorado assumed that it was acceptable to the
Army and alleged so in its amended complaint which was the
equivalent of an entirely new claim.40
During 1988 and 1989, the Army commenced negotiations
with Shell to initiate a consent decree, in an attempt to avoid
litigation.41 When a compromise had been reached, the decree
was submitted to Colorado where it was flatly rejected. The
Army and Shell then attempted to submit the consent decree
to the court for its approval, and met with refusal there as
well."2 In January 1989, the Army withdrew the proposed con-
sent decree and initiated a Federal Facility Agreement which
it signed with Shell.' In response to these maneuvers, the
36. Showdown, supra note 25, at 10,328.
37. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1564. "[S]ubsequent to E.P.A.'s authorization to the
State of Colorado to operate the State's hazardous waste management program, the
Colorado Department of Health ("CDH") issued a final plan to close Basin F, pursu-
ant to State Closure Regulations [6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1007-3 (1982)]." It appears
from the case that the state did not advise the Army that it was developing its own
plan, nor did it indicate that the Army's plan, proposed in June 1986, was insuffi-
cient. Id.; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1564.
[Tihe plaintiff asserts claims against the Army for: (1) failure to close Basin
F in compliance with the Basin F Closure Plan (First Claim); (2) failure to
comply with Colorado's Ground Water Monitoring Regulations, a claim with
three subclaims, and essentially a reassertion of three of the claims set forth
in the plaintiffs' initial complaint (Second Claim); and (3) failure to pay an-
nual operating and waste volume fees, in violation of [sections] 100.31(a) and
(b) of State Fee Regulations, [6 CoLo. CODE REGS. § 1007-3 (1982)].
Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Telephone interview with Michael R. Hope, Deputy Attorney General of
the CERCLA Litigation Section in Denver, Colorado (Nov. 11, 1989)[hereinafter
Interview].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Federal Facilities Agreement is a settlement agreement, the
1991]
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court denied the Army's motion to dismiss this action and or-
dered Colorado to amend and update its motions in the ac-
tion."" The court also ordered Colorado to apply for an expe-
dited hearing on any issues not yet decided. 5
B. Legal Issues
The Army assailed Colorado's enforcement and injunc-
tion action under RCRA, claiming that Congress did not
waive sovereign immunity for federal facilities designated as
CERCLA cleanup sites."" It argued that RCRA was unen-
forceable on two grounds: (1) the enforcement of RCRA was
precluded when ongoing CERCLA cleanups are taking place47
(statutory immunity); and (2) the statutes which Colorado
sought to enforce were ill-suited for federal application"
(statutory deficiency).
Colorado countered that Congress waived sovereign im-
munity in civil actions against federal agencies where those
agencies failed to comply with state hazardous waste manage-
ment and disposal regulations. "9 It also maintained that the
Colorado regulations it sought to apply were identical to those
promulgated by the EPA, and applicable to all federal
agencies. 50
1. Statutory Immunity
The main issue presented by the Army in its motion for
summary judgment was that "sovereign immunity is not
waived [in situations] where there is an ongoing CERCLA
cleanup action at [a] site that addresses hazardous waste re-
equivalent of a consent decree, except for the requirement of a judicial signature. Id.
44. Id.
45. Colorado v United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (D.
Colo. 1989). The court found that CERCLA did not preclude a RCRA enforcement
action and that the state regulations were sufficiently specific to allow enforcement.
Id.
46. Id. at 1564.
47. Id. at 1565.
48. Id. at 1570.
49. Id. at 1564.
50. Id. at 1572.
[Vol. 8
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quirements that are the same in substance as those sought to
be enforced by [Colorado] under RCRA."" The Army also
contended that the regulations sought to be enforced by Colo-
rado were neither precise nor objective, and therefore lacked
the means by which federal compliance could be fairly
gauged.52 Supplemental briefs submitted by both parties ad-
dressed several new aspects of the dispute:
[W]hether the State is precluded from pursuing this ac-
tion because the Army has commenced interim cleanup
measures at Basin F; whether and to what extent the
State will have a role in the Arsenal cleanup if the instant
action is dismissed; and whether the State is proceeding
under RCRA [section] 7002, [42 U.S.C., § 6972] in this
case .... 53
The court heard oral arguments on these questions from both
parties.
Colorado argued that the EPA authorized the state to op-
erate its own hazardous waste management program pursuant
to section 3006(b) of RCRA.' In addition, the state also
demonstrated that the Colorado Department of Health
(CDH) had developed and issued a final plan to close Basin
F." The final plan was issued pursuant to state regulations
and became effective October 2, 1986 as a final order of the
CDH." Colorado also contended that the Army's failure to
appeal or to request review of the plan, which required Basin
F's closure by October 2, 1987, constituted an implied
acceptance.'7
The Army responded by reasserting that the entire Arse-
nal was an ongoing CERCLA cleanup site and therefore, the
EPA retained sole enforcement authority." It emphasized
51. Id. at 1565.
52. Id. at 1570-71.
53. Id. at 1565.
54. Id. at 1564, 1567; 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988).
55. Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1564.
56. Id.; 6 COLO. CoDE REGS. § 1007-3 (1982).
57. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1564.
58. Id. at 1567.
1991]
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that two pending actions, one brought by Colorado and one
brought by the Army, had already been filed under CERCLA
and were directed at the Arsenal cleanup as a whole. 9 Colo-
rado still maintained that Congress had waived sovereign im-
munity, allowing states to initiate civil enforcement actions
against federal entities regarding hazardous waste manage-
ment and disposal." Colorado cited the Solid Waste Disposal
Act" and its amendments under RCRA as the proper author-
ity. 2 The Army disagreed with this interpretation, arguing
that CERCLA's enforcement and response provisions pre-
empted and precluded Colorado from enforcing RCRA-based
cleanup actions."' It also contended that the State's theory
was inconsistent with the maxim that RCRA and CERCLA
were designed to avoid conflicts and to eliminate cleanup du-
plication. 4 Although the RCRA regulations which called for
59. Id. at 1564.
60. Id.
61. Solid Waste Disposal Act § 6001, as amended by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) which provides in pertinent part:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial branches of the Federal Government . . . engaged in any
activity resulting, or which may result, in the disposal or management of
solid waste or hazardous waste shall be subject to, and comply with, all Fed-
eral, State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and proce-
dural (including any requirements for permits or reporting or any provisions
for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to en-
force such relief), respecting control and abatement of solid waste or hazard-
ous waste disposal in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any per-
son is subject to such requirements, including the payment of reasonable
service charges. Neither the United States, nor any agent, employee, or of-
ficer thereof, shall be immune or exempt from any process or sanction of any
State or Federal Court with respect to the enforcement of any such injunc-
tive relief ....
Id.
62. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1564.
63. Id. at 1565.
64. Id. The Army relied on §§ 1006(a) and (b) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6905(a),
(b) to support the argument that the Congressional intent behind RCRA and CER-
CLA was that they be integrated. That section provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in [RCRAJ shall be construed to apply to (or to authorize any
State, interstate, or local authority to regulate) any activity or substance
which is subject to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ... I the Safe
Drinking Water Act... , the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 .... or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . . . , except to the extent
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/10
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avoiding duplication did not specifically mention CERCLA,
the Army argued that this was only because RCRA predated
CERCLA and could not therefore, include it. The Army con-
ceded that Colorado had a role to play in the cleanup, but one
governed by the CERCLA provisions."
After presentations by both sides were concluded, the
court determined that an accurate restatement of the issue
was:
[W]hether the provisions of RCRA and CERCLA can
be harmoniously construed so as to permit the State to
pursue a RCRA suit against the Army seeking hazardous
waste cleanup and abatement laws at Basin F at the same
time as other pending actions instituted under CERCLA
are address entire Arsenal cleanup. 6
The court used this construction of the issue in its determina-
tion of the case.
2. Statutory Deficiency
In its second argument, the Army contended that sover-
eign immunity was not waived when the State standards or
statutes were deficient. It argued that the regulatory stan-
dards Colorado sought to apply "[were] not precise or objec-
that such application (or regulation) is not inconsistent with the require-
ments of such Acts ....
The [EPA] shall integrate all provisions of [RCRA] for purposes of ad-
ministration and enforcement and shall avoid duplication, to the maximum
extent practicable, with the appropriate provisions of the Clean Air Act ....
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.. . , the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act .... the Safe Drinking Water Act .... the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972... and such other Acts of
Congress as grant regulatory authority to the Administrator. Such integration
shall be effected only to the extent that it can be done in a manner consistent
with the goals and policies expressed in [RCRA] . . . and in the other acts
referred to in this subsection.
Id.
65. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1566, 1568; CERCLA, §§ 120(f), 121(d), (e), (f), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9620(f), 9621(d), (e), (f) (1988).
66. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1566-67.
1991]
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tive, and [were] ill-suited for uniform application."67 Relying
on Florida Department of Environmental Regulation v.
Silvex Corp.65 and Kelly v. United States,9 the Army claimed
that Colorado "failed to promulgate objective and ascertaina-
ble regulations by which federal compliance can be fairly
gauged. ' 70 In response, Colorado stated that its environmental
statutes and regulations were verbatim recitations of federal
regulations promulgated by the EPA.7 1 The court held that
the statutes and regulations were sufficiently specific and pre-
cise to satisfy the term "requirements" as set forth in
equivalent federal regulations. 2
IV. Opinion of the Court
The district court found the Army's statutory immunity
argument unimpressive, holding that a pending CERCLA suit
did not preclude a state enforcement action under RCRA .7 It
also determined that the Army's statutory deficiency argu-
ment was without merit, finding that Colorado's own pollution
regulations "tracked almost verbatim, federal regulations
promulgated by E.P.A. 7 4 It held that the State standards
were precise enough to satisfy the term "requirements" as
used in RCRA.75
A. Statutory Immunity
The district court recognized that the United States can-
not be sued without its consent; any legal action must be dis-
67. Id. at 1570.
68. 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
69. 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
70. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1570-71.
71. Id. at 1572.
72. Id. The State compared the language of 6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1007-3 (1982)
with the language of RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988). Id.
73. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D.
Colo. 1989). "[I cannot read a conflict into statutes enacted on the same subject
matter where none exists. Nor can I supply an amendment to a statute that Congress
has chosen not to amend for over eight years." Id.
74. Id. at 1572.
75. Id.
[Vol. 8
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missed for lack of jurisdiction, absent an express statutory
waiver.7 6 However, the court also concluded that a waiver of
immunity must be strictly construed and confined to the
terms and conditions specified in the waiver.7 In order to de-
termine if Congress had given an express statutory waiver of
immunity in this case, the court carefully scrutinized the
wording of several RCRA and CERCLA sections.7 8 The court
determined that no statutory reference to avoid conflicting
and duplicative cleanup actions between RCRA and CERCLA
was apparent.7 "
The district court referred to the well-settled rule of stat-
utory interpretation in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.so
to support its conclusion that CERCLA was independent of,
and in addition to, RCRA8 1 In light of this interpretation, the
court gave great weight to CERCLA, section 120(a)(4) 81 which
"preserves state enforcement actions at federal facilities that
are not listed on the National Priorities List [NPL]."as The
court also underscored that CERCLA requires the federal
government to comply with the Solid Waste Disposal Act and
RCRA, regardless of whether the facility is listed on the
NPL.5
The Army's assertion that RCRA did not specifically dis-
cuss or require integration with CERCLA, because CERCLA
post-dated RCRA,s5 met with equal difficulty. The court rea-
76. Id. at 1565. See generally United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
77. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1565 (citing Stubbs v. United States, 620 F.2d 775
(10th Cir. 1980) and Reynolds v. United States, 643 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 817 (1981)).
78. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1565-69. In deciding that Colorado was not precluded
from enforcement actions, the court relied on several statutes: RCRA §§ 1006, 6001,
7002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6905, 6961, 6972 (1988); CERCLA §§ 114(a), 302(d), 42 U.S.C. §§
9614(a), 9652(d) (1988); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, §
120(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
79. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1566.
80. 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
81. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1569.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
83. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1569.
84. Id. at 1569-70; CERCLA § 120(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(i) (1988).
85. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1566.
1991]
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soned that if Congress had intended such measures, an
amendment to RCRA surely would have materialized in the
eight years since its passage. Since Congress failed to include
CERCLA as one of those amended provisions, it must not
have intended such integration."
The court addressed several of the Army's policy argu-
ments supporting its position. The court rejected the conten-
tion that CERCLA enforcement and remediation should be
given exclusive jurisdiction.87 It found no merit to the Army's
arguments that CERCLA should be given precedence because
it is the most recent statutory scheme, that RCRA would dis-
rupt the ongoing cleanup and serve to duplicate the CERCLA
cleanup, or that state RCRA enforcement would undermine
the goals and policies of CERCLA.8a The court also addressed
the Army's contention that Colorado's requirements were
more burdensome than CERCLA's. The Army argued that the
Colorado closure plan and monitoring requirements necessi-
tated obtaining permits, a time-consuming process compared
to CERCLA provisions which do not require permits.8 Refer-
ring to its frequent cajoling of both parties for their constant
litigation delays, the court reminded the Army that the initial
CERCLA action was commenced in 1983, minimizing the ef-
fect of any delays possibly attributed to the RCRA actions.90
In framing its decision, it appears that the court focused
primarily on the safeguards necessary for protecting Colo-
rado's interests. The court rejected the Army's contentions
that Colorado's interests were adequately protected by CER-
CLA.e1 The court agreed with Colorado's allegations that the
Army and the EPA were bypassing the state in decision-mak-
86. Id. at 1570.
87. Id. at 1569. "It appears that CERCLA was intended to operate indepen-
dently of and in addition to RCRA." Id.
88. Id. at 1568-72. "Nothing in the cited statutes indicates that a CERCLA ac-
tion should take precedence over a RCRA enforcement action." Id.
89. Id. at 1568. "[Tlhe Army contends, the delays incurred in obtaining permits
for RCRA enforcement would frustrate Congress's intent in enacting CERCLA as an
effort to 'speed up' the cleanup process." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1568-69.
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ing processes.9 2 The court also accused the Army and Shell of
bad faith with regards to the cleanup effort and their negotia-
tions toward a consent decree.93 It assailed the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for the apparent conflict of interest, 4 and al-
leged that the agency could not effectively serve as a vigorous
advocate for the public.9 5 Finally, the court concluded that in
RCRA, Congress has plainly provided Colorado with a mean-
ingful voice in the Arsenal cleanup. The court found that the
people of Colorado were best represented by the state in a
RCRA enforcement action. 6
B. Statutory Deficiency
The court addressed the Army's allegation that the "state
has failed to promulgate objective and ascertainable regula-
tions by which federal compliance can be fairly gauged. 9 7 It
addressed the Army's reliance on Florida Department of En-
vironmental Regulation v. Silvex Corp." and Kelly v. United
States,"' distinguishing them on their facts. The court empha-
sized that the state statutes in those cases failed to provide
"objective, quantifiable standards subject to uniform applica-
92. Id. at 1569-72; CERCLA §§ 120(f), 121(d), (e)(2), (f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9620(f),
9621(d), (e)(2), (f) (1988).
93. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D.
Colo. 1989).
94. Id. "Since it is the E.P.A.'s job to achieve a cleanup as quickly and thor-
oughly as possible, and since the Army's obvious financial interest is to spend as little
money and effort as possible on the cleanup, I cannot imagine how one attorney can
vigorously and wholeheartedly advocate both positions." Id.
95. Id.
I conclude that the E.P.A.'s potential monitoring of the Army's Basin F
cleanup operation under CERCLA does not serve as an appropriate or effec-
tive check on the Army's efforts. As long as both of these federal agencies are
represented in the arsenal CERCLA action by the same Justice Department
lawyers who have professed that they have no conflict of interest, even
though one of their clients is a plaintiff and another a defendant in the same
consolidated action, there is no vigorous independent advocate for the public
interest.
Id.
96. Id.
97. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1570-71.
98. 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
99. 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
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tion." 00 The District Court of Colorado relied heavily on the
language of the Middle District Court of Florida's opinion in
Silvex Corp."'0 In Silvex Corp., the state sued the Navy for an
alleged negligent release of hazardous waste materials in viola-
tion of state statutes. 0 2 As in the present case, the Navy
moved for dismissal on the ground that the state statutes were
not requirements as envisioned by Congress.10 3 The district
court in Silvex Corp. concluded that both the legislative his-
tory of RCRA and other analogous statutes addressing the
waiver of immunity, strictly defined requirements as synony-
mous with state objective regulations.104 Because the statutes
in Silvex Corp. failed to set forth specific, precise standards
for the disposal of hazardous waste material, the Navy's mo-
tion to dismiss was upheld. 0 5
The court determined that the facts in Kelly were similar
to those in Silvex Corp.0 6 In Kelly, the waiver provision con-
tained in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was inter-
preted against a state claim brought under Michigan's envi-
ronmental laws, and asserted against a federal agency.107
Unlike Silvex Corp. and Kelly, the court ruled in the present
case that the Colorado statutes tracked the federal statutes
almost verbatim and were therefore sufficient to satisfy the
term "requirements" as used in the regulations. 08
V. Analysis
This case presents unusual challenges to traditional anal-
100. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1572 (quoting Kelly v. United States, 618 F. Supp.
1103, 1108 (W.D. Mich. 1985)).
101. Id. at 1571.
102. See generally Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Silvex Corp., 606 F.
Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
103. Id.; Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1571.
104. See generally Silvex Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1988). The Florida
statutes in question permitted the State to take emergency action when the spillage
of hazardous waste material posed an imminent threat to public health, safety and
welfare. Id.
105. Id.
106. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1571.
107. See generally Kelly, 618 F. Supp. 1103.
108. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1571.
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ysis for several reasons. First, there is ample support for both
the Army's and Colorado's assertions in the statutory provi-
sions of RCRA and CERCLA. To analyze this case and decide
that one party in the action was right and another wrong re-
quires one to accept specific provisions of the statutes virtu-
ally to the exclusion of others. Second, this case is unique in
that two previous actions before the same bench have been
consolidated into one action for judicial economy. This has re-
sulted in several inconsistencies between the present case and
the findings and reasonings of the same bench in United
States v. Shell Oil Co. 10
9
A. Statutory Immunity
United States agencies cannot be sued without the fed-
eral government's consent110 which is usually embodied in a
statutory waiver of immunity. This waiver must be strictly
construed and must be confined to the terms and conditions
specified therein.1 The Federal Government can only be
sued in those instances where it has given its permission. The
courts should limit the exposure of the government by strictly
and narrowly interpreting statutes which grant permission to
sue. In the present case, the Army conceded that section 6001
of RCRA, read in conjunction with section 7002, contained a
waiver of federal sovereign immunity.'1 2 The Army's sovereign
immunity claim, however, detailed a specific instance where
the immunity waiver was inapplicable."' This was apparently
an assault on the requirement that the waiver must be con-
fined to the terms and conditions specified. The gravamen of
the Army's claim was that sovereign immunity is not waived
when CERCLA cleanup actions are already taking place and a
subsequent state enforcement action, addressing substantially
109. 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. Tes-
tan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
111. See, e.g., Stubbs v. United States, 620 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v.
United States, 643 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817 (1981).
112. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1564-65
(D. Colo. 1989).
113. Id. at 1565.
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the same hazardous waste requirements, ensues.11" ' The Army
argued "CERCLA's enforcement and response provisions pre-
empt and preclude a state RCRA-enforcement action with re-
spect to the cleanup of hazardous wastes at the Arsenal. 1 15
The Army's position is not devoid of statutory support.
RCRA specifically limits the ability of a party to com-
mence a legal action against the government" 6 once the Ad-
ministrator has initiated an action, 1 7 is engaged in a removal
action,118 has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investiga-
tion and Feasibility Study,11 9 or has obtained a court order
and is proceeding with a remedial action.120
Comparing the circumstance in this case to the RCRA
provisions above, it appears that the cleanup actions taken by
the Army support its contention that Colorado's legal actions
are prohibited. The Army demonstrated that its Remedial In-
vestigation and Feasibility Study under CERCLA was initi-
ated in October 1984.121 The interim remedial action plan was
proposed in June 1986, well before the commencement of this
action by Colorado. The plan was subsequently delivered to
the state in December 1987.122 Therefore, pursuant to section
7002(b)(2)(B) of RCRA, Colorado would be without authority
to initiate an action because the Army had already com-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B) (1988). ("No action may
be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section if the Administrator, in or-
der to restrain or abate acts or conditions .... ).
117. Id. § 7002(b)(2)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(i) ("has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting an action under ... section 106 of [CERCLA].").
118. Id. § 7002(b)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(ii) ("is actually engaging
in a removal action under section 104 of [CERCLAI").
119. Id. § 7002(b)(2)(B)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(iii) ("[hias incurred costs
to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study under section 104 of [CER-
CLA] and is diligently proceeding with a remedial action under that Act ....").
120. Id. § 7002(b)(2)(B)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) ("has obtained a court
order (including a consent decree) or issued an administrative order under section
106 of [CERCLA] ... pursuant to which a responsible party is diligently conducting a
removal action, Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS), or proceeding
with a remedial action.").
121. Colorado v. Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (D. Colo. 1989); cf.
supra note 26.
122. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1568.
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menced removal actions under section 104 of CERCLA and
had incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study.
The court recognized that the CERCLA Remedial Inves-
tigation and Feasibility Study was in progress and that "in-
terim response" cleanup measures by the Army were in fact
underway.2 However, it apparently gave those factors little
weight. Ironically, this same district court in United States v.
Shell Oil Co.,12  recognized that the Army had been directing
cleanup activities at the Arsenal since 1975.123 These activities
amounted to a cost of nearly $48,000,000 as late as December
1983.12" The court found that Shell Oil Company could be pe-
cuniarily liable under section 107 of CERCLA for actions
taken by the Army pursuant to sections 104 and 106.127 This
was possible notwithstanding that some of these costs were in-
curred prior to CERCLA's enactment. 128 The court also recog-
nized that "Army personnel are currently working to develop
a comprehensive cleanup plan, a plan which may require im-
plementation over many years and cost hundreds of millions
of dollars."12
Although the CERCLA and RCRA provisions mentioned
above present strong support for the Army's contentions of
statutory preclusion, the court failed to use those provisions
in making its decision. Instead, the court gave great weight to
the broad provisions of section 6001 of RCRA,130 and the ex-
press waiver of immunity contained therein. In construing the
waiver verbatim, the court gave section 6001 of RCRA a strict
interpretation. It did not, however, give the provision a nar-
123. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1567.
124. 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
125. Id. at 1084.
126. Id. at 1068.
127. Id. at 1072-77.
128. Id. at 1073. "I conclude that the unavoidably retroactive nature of CER-
CLA, and Congress' decision in CERCLA to impose the cost of cleaning up of hazard-
ous waste sites on the responsible parties rather than on taxpayers, strongly indicate
Congressional intent to hold responsible parties liable for pre-enactment government
response costs." Id.
129. Id. at 1084.
130. See supra note 61.
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row interpretation as required.
A narrow interpretation of this statute, taken in conjunc-
tion with these facts, would require a court to recognize that
RCRA, at least inferentially, addressed the integration of en-
forcement actions. 181 As stated above, the rule that a waiver of
immunity must be strictly construed and must be confined to
the terms and conditions specified' s3 mandates a narrow con-
struction of immunity statutes. In the present case, the inte-
gration provisions of RCRA served as a parameter for the dis-
trict court to determine the extent of the express waiver of
statutory immunity. The Army argued that the extent of the
waiver of immunity was not governed solely by the express
waiver in section 6001 of RCRA, but by that provision taken
in pari materia. Specifically, the Army contended that section
1006(b)(1) of RCRA would assist in the analysis.'33
The Army vehemently argued "that Congress intended
that RCRA and CERCLA be integrated to avoid conflicts and
to eliminate duplication.'' It found support for this proposi-
tion in section 1006(b)(1) which essentially provides that the
EPA shall integrate all the provisions of RCRA for enforce-
ment and administration purposes and avoid duplication,
wherever possible, with all other environmental regulations
and "other such Acts of Congress as grant regulatory author-
ity to the Administrator.' 3 5 Clearly, CERCLA is an act which
confers authority on the EPA and as such, should be inte-
grated with RCRA. The court responded by stating that if
Congress intended CERCLA to apply as the Army suggested,
it would have enacted legislation to that effect. 36 This re-
sponse by the court can hardly be considered as a strict and
narrow construction of a statutory waiver of immunity.
Section 1006(b)(1) of RCRA expressly delineates the de-
sire to avoid duplication of effort and mandates the integra-
tion with a litany of other environmental statutes. RCRA also
131. Colorado v. Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1566 (D. Colo. 1989).
132. Id. at 1565; see also supra note 75.
133. Id. at 1566.
134. Id.
135. Id.; RCRA § 1006, 42 U.S.C. § 6905 (1988). See supra note 64.
136. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1566.
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includes within its parameters "such other Acts of Congress as
grant authority to the [EPA].""' CERCLA falls within the
category of congressional acts which grant authority to the
EPA. Even a narrow construction of section 1006(b)(1) would,
therefore, have to include CERCLA as an act which requires
integration with RCRA. This was the position suggested by
the Army. The court, however, chose a different analysis. It
ruled that CERCLA was not specifically mentioned in the
statute and thus was not included among those express excep-
tions.138 The Army protested that the only reason CERCLA
was not mentioned in the RCRA statute was because RCRA
pre-dated CERCLA. " 9 The court dismissed this point, ratio-
nalizing that Congress had eight years subsequent to CER-
CLA's passage, in which to amend RCRA, but did not do
SO.140 Based on these facts, it is difficult to conform the court's
rationale with the well settled requirements of strict statutory
construction.
The strength of the court's decision stems from section
120(a)(4) of CERCLA14 1 which governs state laws concerning
enforcement. This provision requires federal facilities to com-
ply with state laws when such facilities are not included on
the National Priorities List (NPL). The difficulty with apply-
ing this statute to the present facts is that while the entire
Arsenal was listed on the NPL, Basin F, a subfacility, was not
listed. With the entire Arsenal listed as a federal Superfund
site, it is difficult to imagine that every subfacility of the Arse-
nal would also be required to be listed on the NPL. This diffi-
137. Id. quoting RCRA § 1006, 42 U.S.C. § 6905 (1988). "Since it is the E.P.A.'s
job to achieve a cleanup as quickly and thoroughly as possible, and since the Army's
obvious financial interest is to spend as little money and effort as possible on the
cleanup, I cannot imagine how one attorney can vigorously and wholeheartedly advo-
cate both positions." Id. at 1570.
138. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1566-70.
139. Id. at 1566.
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988). "State laws concerning removal and remedial
action, including State laws regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and reme-
dial action at facilities owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumental-
ity of the United States when such facilities are not included on the National Priori-
ties List." Id.
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culty could be avoided by a strict, narrow interpretation of
the waiver of immunity provision. If the district court had fol-
lowed the recognized requirements for waiver of immunity as
delineated by the United State Supreme Court, than Colo-
rado's enforcement action would be precluded as incompatible
with section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA. By recognizing that the
entire facility was listed on the NPL and therefore remediated
under CERCLA provisions, Colorado would not have been al-
lowed to" 'carve out' Basin F and proceed under RCRA, sepa-
rate and apart from the Army's CERCLA cleanup anticipated
for the Arsenal as a whole .... ",142
B. Statutory Deficiency
The Army claimed that Colorado's enforcement action
was barred because the state regulations were neither precise
nor objective, and ill-suited for uniform application. " ' The
court found that there was little merit to these allegations. It
based this decision on a word-for-word comparison of the
state regulations "4 with the federal RCRA regulations. These
regulations were already directly applicable to federal facili-
ties and agencies and track almost verbatim the state provi-
sions. The decision of the court dismissing this claim under
a statutory deficiency theory was merited. This was not, how-
ever, the principle rationale in the decision of the court. A
close reading of the case reveals a deep sense of judicial dis-
trust for all of the parties involved. 146 It appears that this dis-
trust was the foundation for the court's decision.
C. Public Policy Considerations
In denying the Army's motion to dismiss, the court went
to great lengths to examine the role that Colorado would play
in the event the motion were to succeed. The court found in-
142. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1567.
143. Id. at 1570.
144. Id. at 1572. A full recitation of the Colorado statutes is provided in an an-
nex to the decision at pages 1572-1577.
145. Id. at 1572.
146. See supra notes 90, 93-95 and accompanying text.
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sufficient the following public protections afforded by CER-
CLA: 1 7 1) the opportunity of the public to participate in the
planning and selection of remedial action; " 8 2) the state's
right to participate in the cleanup remedy selection process
and to seek review of the remedy selected;149 3) the state's
ability to seek compliance with its own standards; 150 4) proce-
dures for judicial challenge of the United States remedial ac-
tion plan prior to implementation; 1 1 and 5) public participa-
tion in the cleanup process by means of written and oral
comments in a public meeting near the facility. 152 The court
gave several reasons for this determination. First, the Army's
cleanup efforts would go unchecked by any party with adverse
interests, if the action was dismissed in accordance with the
Army's arguments. Second, the court concluded, that the
EPA's monitoring of the cleanup under CERCLA did not
serve as an adequate check on the Army. Finally, the court
feared that if the CERCLA action failed, the people of Colo-
rado would be left to pay for the cleanup.1 53
The court showed several manifestations of distrust of
the parties in this case. It determined that there was a conflict
of interest within the Department of Justice which precluded
them from adequately representing the interest of the general
public.1 ' It also determined that "the Army's obvious finan-
cial interest is to spend as little money and effort as possible
on the cleanup .... Furthermore, the court suggested that
once the Army was satisfied that it had met its obligations,
Colorado would be responsible to its citizens if the process
had not been thorough.156
In deciding United States v. Shell Oil Co., the court con-
sidered these same propositions with somewhat different re-
147. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1568-69.
148. CERCLA § 120(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(f) (1988).
149. Id. 8 121(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f).
150. Id. 88 121(d), (e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9621(d), (e).
151. Id. § 121(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(3)(B).
152. Id. §§ 113(k), 117, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(k), 9617.
153. Army, 707 F.Supp. 1562, 1570.
154. Id. at 1570.
155. Id.; cf. supra note 28.
156. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1570.
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suits. In United States v. Shell Oil Co., the court determined
that Colorado and the Army were co-trustees for the natural
resources of the Arsenal with the authority to act on behalf of
the public.1"' The court expressly supported the obligations
and responsibilities undertaken by the Army.158 The court de-
termined that as a trustee, the Army had an obligation that
went beyond its own interests.15 9
The court's findings in this action raise several questions
when compared with the findings in Shell Oil Co. The incon-
sistencies between the decisions in Army and Shell Oil Co. are
significant ones. While the court's concern for the public as
voiced here is admirable, it provides little support for its deci-
sion in the face of such strong statutory evidence. The stat-
utes do generally show a facial waiver of sovereign immunity
in deference to state enforcement actions. Yet, that waiver is
extinguished where the EPA has undertaken an action under
CERCLA.
VI. Conclusion
Colorado has a bona fide interest in subjecting federal
agencies or facilities within its borders to enforcement actions
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.
While the federal government has issued a broad waiver of
immunity under these statutes, it is clear that there are spe-
cific instances where that immunity is not waived. RCRA spe-
cifically provides the EPA to undertake an integration of
157. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1080; CERCLA §§ 107(f), 115, 42 U.S.C. §§
9607(f), 9615 (1988).
158. Id. at 1082. "It is the Army that continues to plan, in consultation with the
Environmental Protection Agency, a comprehensive solution to the Arsenal contami-
nation problem. It is the Army that is the designated trustee for natural resources at
the Arsenal." Id.
159. Id. at 1083.
The Army stands before this court not just as a proponent for its own inter-
ests, but also as a trustee for the natural resources at the Arsenal. As such, it
has a fiduciary obligation to the citizens of this country to ensure that the
Arsenal cleanup is complete. As trustee, the Army is bound to accept respon-
sibility for its share of the costs of cleanup and damages for injury to the
natural resources.
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cleanup actions. The actions taken by the Army were clearly
initiated under the penumbra of CERCLA. This court deter-
mined that issue in the previous Shell Oil Co. decision. As a
result, Colorado must defer to the federal government and its
agencies (the EPA and the Army) for resolution of this
problem.
Nonetheless, Colorado is not without recourse. CER-
CLA's provisions for state participation in the cleanup have
proven extremely effective. Under CERCLA, a state can par-
ticipate in the planning and selecting of remedial actions. It
can seek review of the selected process if it desires, and can
even seek compliance with the state's own standards. The
only constraint is that the cleanup operation falls under the
jurisdiction of the federal government.
Although Colorado made bold allegations of bad faith on
the part of the Army, it must be remembered that the Army
was developing four response plans, all of which were rejected
by Colorado. It is also noteworthy that while the Army was
drafting these plans, Colorado was preparing for civil action
rather than actively participating in the plans' developments.
Perhaps the strongest support for the Army's contention
emanates from the status of this case to date. As of this writ-
ing, there has been no activity on any of the consolidated
cases concerning the Arsenal. Colorado complied with the ju-
dicial direction to amend and update Colorado's motion for
preliminary injunction and motion for partial summary judg-
ment within eleven days. The court also directed that the par-
ties submit a subsequent request for an expedited hearing to
address remaining issues. °10 That order also was complied
with, but that is where it has ended. The court has failed to
enforce its decision in this case. Instead the required docu-
ments, long since filed, sit awaiting disposition. It is highly
probable that any decision on the merits of this case will be
appealed.
There is hope that the Army and Colorado can come to
terms and settle this matter through an alternative method.
160. Telephone interview with Michael R. Hope, Deputy Attorney General of the
CERCLA Litigation Section in Denver, Colorado (Nov. 11, 1989).
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Perhaps the parties should enter into a Memorandum of
Agreement similar to the one they engaged in earlier. Any fur-
ther delays will only exacerbate the problem at everyone's ex-
pense. The cost of the cleanup increases incrementally with
time; the resentment of the public towards both the federal
and state governments festers. Moreover, the image of envi-
ronmental legislation fades into one of uselessness. A judicial
direction to adopt an agreement in conformity with both
RCRA and CERCLA regulations, where the federal govern-
ment maintains its status as lead agency enforcing the stan-
dards of the Colorado statutes, may also serve to benefit the
parties.
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